Approaching probabilistic and deterministic nomic truths in an inductive probabilistic way by Kuipers, Theo A.F.
1 
 
Approaching probabilistic and deterministic nomic truths in an inductive probabilistic way 
 
Theo A.F. Kuipers (University of Groningen, The Netherlands) 





Theories of truth approximation in terms of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) almost always deal with 
(non-probabilistically) approaching deterministic truths, either actual or nomic. This paper deals first 
with approaching a probabilistic nomic truth, viz. a true probability distribution. It assumes a 
multinomial probabilistic context, hence with a lawlike true, but usually unknown, probability 
distribution. We will first show that this true multinomial distribution can be approached by Carnapian 
inductive probabilities. Next we will deal with the corresponding deterministic nomic truth, that is, the 
set of conceptually possible outcomes with a positive true probability. We will introduce Hintikkian 
inductive probabilities, based on a prior distribution over the relevant deterministic nomic theories and 
on conditional Carnapian inductive probabilities, and first show that they enable again probabilistic 
approximation of the true distribution. Finally, we will show, in terms of a kind of success theorem, 
based on Niiniluoto’s estimated distance from the truth, in what sense Hintikkian inductive 
probabilities enable the probabilistic approximation of the relevant deterministic nomic truth. In sum, 
the (realist) truth approximation perspective on Carnapian and Hintikkian inductive probabilities leads 
to the unification of the inductive probability field and the field of truth approximation. 
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Theories of truth approximation in terms of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) almost always deal with 
(non-probabilistically) approaching deterministic truths, either actual or nomic, and have a Popperian 
background. E.g. Graham Oddie’s Likeness to truth (1986) and Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Truthlikeness (1987) 
focus on deterministic actual truths. My own From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (Kuipers, 
2000) and Nomic truth approximation revisited (Kuipers, 2019) deal almost exclusively with 
(qualitatively) approaching deterministic nomic truths, based on the hypothetico-deductive method.  
This paper deals first with approaching a probabilistic nomic truth, viz. a true probability 
distribution. It assumes a multinomial probabilistic context, hence with a lawlike true, but usually 
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unknown, distribution. Approaching this true multinomial distribution can naturally be based on 
Carnapian inductive logic or inductive probability theory (Kuipers, 1978). Assume e.g. random 
sampling with replacement in an urn with colored balls. The primary problem of truthlikeness, or 
verisimilitude, is the logical problem of finding an optimal definition. In the present context this 
amounts to an optimal definition of the distance between any (multinomial) probability distribution 
and the, presumably unknown, true distribution. There are some plausible standard measures. 
However, the epistemic problem of verisimilitude is at least as interesting: what is a plausible 
distribution to start with, and how to update it in the light of empirical evidence such that convergence 
to the true distribution, that is, truth approximation, takes place. It will be shown that Carnap-systems, 
starting from equal probabilities, converge in an inductive probabilistic way to the corresponding true 
probabilities, i.e. the true multinomial distribution (or the probabilistic nomic truth).  
Next we will introduce Hintikkian inductive probabilities, based on a prior distribution over 
the relevant deterministic nomic theories (a kind of constituents) and on conditional Carnapian 
inductive probabilities, and show that they enable again probabilistic approximation of the true 
multinomial distribution. Hintikkian systems add to this the inductive probabilistic convergence to the 
true constituent, i.e., the deterministic nomic truth about which conceptual possibilities are nomically 
possible, here specified as those which have a positive true probability. However, on second thoughts 
it is problematic to call this a genuine form of truth approximation. It turns out to be more plausible to 
take into account Niiniluoto’s notion of estimated distance to the truth, which can be based on the 
Hintikkian probabilities. Hence, if applied in the random sampling context, both Carnapian and 
Hintikkian types of systems can be reconstructed as inductively approaching a probabilistic nomic 
truth and, in the Hintikka-case, in addition as inductively approaching a deterministic nomic truth in 
terms of a decreasing estimated distance from the truth.  
Some more background may be useful. The focus in this paper is, like in Kuipers (2000, 
2019), on nomic truths, that is, truths dealing with which conceptual possibilities are nomically, e.g. 
physically or biologically, possible and which ones are not, the nomic (im-)possibilities, for short. A 
deterministic nomic truth just states which conceptual possibilities are nomically possible. A 
probabilistic nomic truth is in fact more detailed. It states the objective probabilities (if applicable) of 
the conceptual possibilities, non-zero for the nomic possibilities and zero for the nomic impossibilities. 
Objective probabilities are conceived of as objective dispositions or tendencies of a device to generate 
outcomes of which the relative frequencies have limits corresponding to these objective probability 
values. (Note that we do not deal with the logical possibility of nomic possibilities with zero 
probability.) In sum, nomic truths describe lawlike behavior of some kind or another. Since we will 
exclusively deal with nomic truths, deterministic or probabilistic, we will not always insert ‘nomic’ 
where it would be appropriate. 
 Now there are at least three options for nomic truth approximation: 
Option 1. Non-probabilistically approaching a deterministic nomic truth 
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Option 2. Probabilistically approaching a probabilistic nomic truth  
Option 3. Probabilistically approaching a deterministic nomic truth 
As suggested before, Option 1 has been the primary focus of research explicitly dealing with truth 
approximation. As reflected in the title, this paper deals primarily with Options 2 and 3, using 
inductive probabilities, but we will need some aspects of Option 1, in the rest of this introduction and 
in Section 4 and 6. For the logically possible fourth option, i.e. non-probabilistically approaching a 
probabilistic nomic truth, we see no meaningful interpretation. 
As far as (Kuipers, 2000, 2019) are concerned, Option 1 deals primarily with qualitative 
(basic, refined, and stratified) ways of approximation of a deterministic nomic truth. A consequence 
of the basic definition of closer to the truth in this approach will play a recurrent role in this 
paper. The definition itself is given in terms of sets of conceptual possibilities (X, Y), and 
amounts to a (set-theoretically) decreasing symmetric difference with the set T of nomic 
possibilities: 
 
 Y is ∆-closer to T (= set of nomic possibilities) than X iff Y∆T ⊂ X∆T 
 
It is important to note that in the context of nomic deterministic truth approximation, theories X and Y 
amount to the (maximal) claims X=T and Y=T, respectively. Of course, these claims are mutually 
incompatible. Following the terminology of Niiniluoto (1987), the definition is restricted to complete 
answers to the cognitive problem which subset of conceptual possibilities corresponds to the true one, 
i.e. T. Hence, in the case that for example Y is a subset of X, the claim of Y does not entail that of X, as 
one might think, the two claims are incompatible.
1. 2
  
Together with a corresponding definition of ‘more successful’ it is possible to prove the 
crucial (basic) success theorem. It states that a theory which is ∆-closer to the nomic truth than another 
is always at least as successful and in fact, under some plausible conditions, more successful in the 
long run. The idea of something like a success theorem in other cases will play a guiding role in the 
paper. 
In Section 2 we will introduce for a ‘multinomial context’, the true multinomial distribution 
(the probabilistic nomic truth) and candidate probability distributions (probabilistic nomic theories) for 
approaching it (Option 2), and prove a restricted success theorem. Section 3 studies the extent to 
which the true multinomial distribution can be approached by Carnapian inductive probabilities. 
                                                            
1
 In Kuipers (2019) we deal with incomplete answers by introducing ‘two-sided’ theories. 
2
 To be sure, the definition of ‘∆-closer to’ enables a variant of the so-called ‘child’s play objection’ (Oddie, 
2016). It amounts to the case that if we know that X∩T = ∅ then it is easy to come ∆-closer to the truth, viz. by 
taking any subset Y of X, even though the claim of Y is not entailed by that of X. However, knowing that X∩T = 
∅ is in the context of nomic truth approximation quite a strong and not a realistic assumption, for just one 
counterexample, leading to T−X ≠ ∅, is not at all enough. This is quite different from the situation in case of 
factual truth approximation, where we assume that T = {t}, with t as the actual world t. Here, coming to know a 
false consequence of X and hence t∉X it is enough to come ∆-closer to the truth by taking a subset of X.     
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Section 4 deals with the basics of deterministic nomic truth and deterministic nomic theories 
approaching it (Option 1). In Section 5 we introduce Hintikkian inductive probabilities, based on a 
prior distribution over the relevant deterministic theories and conditional Carnapian inductive 
probabilities, enabling again probabilistic approximation of the true multinomial distribution (Option 
2). In Section 6 we show, based on a kind of success theorem, in what sense Hintikkian inductive 
probabilities enable the probabilistic approximation of a deterministic nomic truth (Option 3), viz. in 
terms of Niiniluoto’s estimated distance from the truth. Section 7 presents some concluding remarks.  
Carnap- and Hintikka-systems of inductive probabilities were the crucial focus of my 
dissertation (Kuipers, 1978). After more than 40 years, I begin to understand that it can best be seen in 
light of approaching probabilistic nomic truths, that is, of approaching the relevant true probability 
distribution. This, evidently, realist perspective
3
 leads to the unification of the two research fields, that 
is, the inductive probability field and the field of truth approximation. As a matter of fact, I consider 
all approaches to a true probability distribution, and therefore all (perhaps frequency interpreted) 
inferential statistics also to be approaches to the truth. 
To be sure, much of what is presented in this paper is not new. The goal of the paper is a 
systematic presentation of what systems of inductive probability of Carnapian and Hintikkian style can 
offer from the perspective of probabilistic truth approximation, in particular the epistemological 
problem. This leads to the search for relevant success theorems: does ‘closer to the truth’ entail ‘more 
successfulness’? In addition, besides presenting some well-known evidence-based logical (or internal 
or ’with certainty’) conditional, stepwise and limit results, we will study, assuming an underlying 
multinomial experiment, the objective (or external and, a number of times, ‘with probability 1’) 
conditional, stepwise and limit behavior of such systems. In both cases, some well-known theorems of 
arithmetic and probability theory will be used. 
Both types of results show that it is perfectly possible to combine the inductive probabilistic 
and the truth approximation perspective, both in the logical and the objective sense. This is contrary to 
what was (and still is?) believed in empiricist, Carnapian circles and realist, Popperian circles. In fact 
this paper extends the claim in (Kuipers, 2000) that in the context of deterministic theories the 
inductive instrumentalist methodology is perfectly compatible with the realist truth approximation 
perspective. In both cases holds that even ‘inductivists’ who are reluctant to subscribe to the truth 
approximation perspective are in practice approaching the truth in certain contexts, that is, whether 
they like it or not. 
We conclude this section with some clarifications regarding the specific relation of this paper 
to other work. 
                                                            
3 The realist perspective is here understood in the sense of ‘constructive realism’ (Kuipers, 2000). Concepts, e.g. 
as represented by Q-predicates, see below, are at least partly man-made and hence the resulting truths do not 
only depend on the way the world is but are also conceptually relative.  
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 There are many ways how to estimate the bias of a multinomial experiment, for example 
random sampling with replacement, a wheel of fortune or roulette, statistically, e.g. by (Bayesian) 
Dirichlet distributions or frequentist means. It is plausible that these statistical methods can be 
rephrased and further articulated in terms of inductive probabilities and (increasing) verisimilitude. 
For example, Festa (1993) showed the equivalence of certain Dirichlet distributions and (generalized) 
Carnap-systems and studied optimization of the latter from the truth approximation perspective.  
As stated before, here we restrict our attention to the study of the inductive methods of Carnap 
and Hintikka from the perspective of truth approximation. Whereas standard statistical methods seem 
to go straight to their target, whether or not called ‘the truth’, the two inductive methods were 
designed to learn, with a self-chosen speed, from experience in a systematic and conceptually 
transparent way, without (Carnap) or with (Hintikka) some objective target, the truth, in mind. 
Whereas Carnap focused on one-step prediction probabilities, Hintikka focused on, using Carnap- 
systems, probabilities for generalizations. The surplus value of such inductive systems in particular 
when seen in the truth approximation perspective is that they articulate leading intuitions of layman 
and scientists, in particular other than statisticians, and hence they enable conceptually transparent 
communication.  
As said, Roberto Festa (1993, Part III) studied already (generalized) Carnap-systems from the 
perspective of truth approximation, but his focus was not on the (logical or objective) limit behavior, 
but on the logical and epistemic ‘problem op optimality’. That is, the logically and epistemically 
optimal choices of parameters, the former in view of the objective probabilities (in fact a 
generalization of Carnap (1952, Section 2)) and the latter in view of the background knowledge.  
As is well known, Jaakko Hintikka (1966) introduced stratified systems of inductive 
probability, based on Carnap-systems, leaving room for generalizations, and he assumed a particular 
prior distribution over generalizations. He focused on, among other things, the logical limit behavior 
of such systems, leading to ‘with certainty results’: like Carnap-systems, the ‘special values’ converge 
to the relative frequency, and the probability of the strongest generalization compatible with the 
evidence converges to 1, assuming that this strongest generalization remains constant.  
In his monumental book on truthlikeness, Niiniluoto (1987) focused, regarding the epistemic 
problem of verisimilitude, primarily on the momentary ‘evidence-based’ probabilistic estimation of 
the distance of a deterministic theory from the deterministic truth, based on a quantitative distance 
measure between theories. However, in Section 9.5 on the estimation problem for (deterministic, 
monadic) generalizations, where the relevant truth is a deterministic generalization, he includes also 
the logical (with certainty) limit behavior of the estimated distance from the truth, along the lines of 
Hintikka.  
As suggested before, besides incorporating ‘with certainty’ results, we concentrate on the 
objective conditional, stepwise and limit behavior of such systems, frequently, not ‘with certainty’, but 
‘with probability 1’. 
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As before indicated, we will use the phrases ‘the probabilistic (nomic) truth’ and ‘the true 
(multinomial) (probability) distribution’ interchangeably.  
 
 
2. The probabilistic nomic truth and probabilistic nomic theories approaching it 
This section deals with Option 2, probabilistically approaching a probabilistic nomic truth. In the 
whole paper we assume a specific context of application: a multinomial context, that is,  
an experimental device enabling successive experiments with a finite set of conceptually possible, 
observable, outcomes, where the successive outcomes of the experiment are probabilistically 
independent and have a fixed probability. Random sampling with replacement in an urn with colored 
balls is a typical example of a multinomial context. Think also of a possibly biased wheel of fortune or 
roulette. It is important to note that in this paper all possible outcomes are supposed to be observable. 
Our theorems are not claimed to apply to theoretical, non-observable, outcomes.  
 We will use the following terminology and notation:  
K is the set or universe4 of a finite number k (≥ 2) of conceptually possible (elementary) 
outcomes: K = {Q1, Q2,…, Qk}. The ‘Q-predicates’ are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive. 
The probabilistic nomic (pn-)truth is the true probability distribution: t = {t1, t2, …tk}, 0≤ti<1, Σti=1. A 
(probabilistic nomic) pn-theory is any k-tuple x = {x1, x2, …xk}, such that 0≤xi<1, i.e. x ∈ [0, 1)
k
, and 
Σxi=1, with the claim x = t. The set of conceptually possible pn-theories is F=df {x | x∈ [0, 1)
k 
, xi 
=1}. Note that the claim of a pn-theory is a complete answer to the cognitive problem: “Which 
distribution is the true one?” Of course, besides the true one, all other pn-theories are false, however 
close they may be to the true one. Moreover, they are mutually incompatible and, in a generalized 
sense, of equal logical strength. 
As a matter of fact, all results to be reported are dealing with the limit behavior of |xi – ti|, or 
some variant, for any single Qi, where xi is based on the available prior knowledge and evidence. So, 
we do not really need any overall distance function between distributions. In the literature several 
sophisticated distance functions are discussed. However, the most simple and plausible distance 
functions between pn-theories fitting to our primary results are the city-block distance d1(x, y) =df Σ|xi 
− yi| and the Euclidean distance d2(x, y) =df (Σ(xi − yi)
2
 )
1/2. Both lead to plausible definitions of “pn-
theory y is closera to the pn-truth t than pn-theory x” iff da(y, t) < da(x, t), with a = 1 or 2. An even 
stronger (more demanding) definition than both is “y is closer3 to the pn-truth t than x” iff ∀i |yi − ti| ≤ 
|xi − ti| and ‘<’ holds at least once. 
 For quantitative evidence we will use the following notations.  
 - en reports the ordered outcomes of the first n experiments, 
 - ni(en), or simply ni, indicates the number of Qi-occurrences; note that ni is a random variable. 
                                                            
4
 In probability theory this set is usually called the sample space. 
7 
 
We will soon turn to the updating of pn-theories, but first we will introduce one comparative result for 
two fixed pn-theories, viz. a kind of success theorem, that is, about the comparative limit behavior of 
two pn-theories to be expected due to the limit behavior of the corresponding relative frequency. We 
will use the following restricted definitions:  
 
Definition: y is relative to Qi closer to the pn-truth than x iff |ti − yi|  <  |ti −xi| or, 
equivalently:  (ti − yi)
2
  <  (ti − xi)
2
 , i.e. a smaller distance from the true probability of Qi. 
 
Definition: y is relative to Qi in en more successful than x iff |ni/n − yi| <  |ni/n − xi| or, 
equivalently: (ni/n − yi)
2
  <  (ni/n − xi)
2, i.e. a smaller distance from the observed relative 
frequency of Qi. 
 
Theorem 1: Restricted Expected (Probabilistic-)Success Theorem 
If y is relative to Qi closer to the pn-truth than x if and only if it may be expected that en is such 
that y is relative to Qi more successful than x. 
 
For the proof, see the Appendix. Note the ‘if’-side. It may seem surprising, for a success theorem 
normally is restricted to the ‘only if’-side: closer to the truth entails more success. See e.g. Theorem 5, 
below. However, Theorem 1 deals with ‘expected success’. 
Of course, there is a plausible generalization of this theorem based on the very strong 
definition of ‘closer to’, i.e. ‘closer3 to’, and a similarly strong version of ‘more successful’, i. e. both 
starting with “for all Qi ….”. 
 
 
3. Probabilistic nomic truth approximation by Carnapian inductive probabilities 
This section deals with a Carnapian way of realizing Option 2 (probabilistically approaching a 
probabilistic nomic truth). As before: given is a device enabling successive experiments where the 
successive outcomes of the experiment are probabilistically independent and have a fixed probability. 
Hence, a multinomial device with nomological or nomic behavior, i.e. with a set K of a finite number 
k(≥2) of possible (observable) outcomes Q1, Q2, … Qk, with true probabilities t1, t2, … tk (0≤ti≤1, 
Σti=1). Recall that en reports the ordered outcomes of the first n experiments, and ni the number of Qi-
occurrences. The Carnapian 'characteristic value' or ‘prediction function’ pC(Qi|en), i.e. the probability 
that Qi will be the outcome of the next experiment, i.e. after en, is defined as the weighted mean of the 
relative frequency (ni/n) and the logical or initial probability (1/k), i.e. the initial probabilistic nomic 
(pn-)theory: 




   + n +    = ni + /kn +   ,with real-valued λ, 0< λ< ∞ (1C)             
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Informally we may say that this Carnapian value is an inductive probability in the sense that it will 
gradually approach the true (nomic) probability ti of Qi, since the relative frequency (ni/n) will do so 
and its weight (n/(n + λ)) will approach 1 at the cost of the weight of the initial probability (1/k). The 
smaller the parameter λ the faster this convergence will take place. In sum: this ‘Carnap-system’ is 
here a perfect means of approaching (k) ‘probabilistic nomic truths’, by gradually learning from 
experience in a probabilistic way, i.e. Option 2. Note that just taking the relative frequency, the so-
called straight rule, is also a form of learning from experience, a jumping form. However, apart from 
technical probability problems, you then exclude every conceptual possibility you have not yet 
observed, by assigning zero probability, which is not very open minded, to say the least.  
 The informal claim that the prediction function (1C) goes to the pn-truth ti when n goes to ∞, 
still needs a precise definition and corresponding theorem. Let Probt indicate the probability according 
to the probabilistic truth t =df < t1, t2, … tk>.  
 
 Theorem 2: Carnap-systems converge to the probabilistic nomic truth 
Informally, the Carnapian updating of the initial pn-theory approaches the pn-truth with 
probability 1. 
 Formally: 
Probt (lim n→∞ pC(Qi|en) = ti) = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |pC(Qi|en) – ti| < ε] = 1,  
i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N |
ni + /k
n + 
  – ti| < ε)] = 1 
 
Theorem 2 is, in more or less detail, well-known in the literature. For the proof, based on the strong 
law of large numbers, see the Appendix. 
Although the theorem is a kind of condition sine qua non for calling Carnapian updating in the 
multinomial context truth approximation, there is a more specific intuition associated with truth 
approximation: ‘later’ Carnapian pn-theories are, as a rule, closer to the true probability (the pn-truth) 
than ‘earlier’ ones, that is, as a rule, there is stepwise approximation. However, this is not precisely 
what we can prove. Recall that ti is the true probability of Qi and hence the limit of ni/n as n goes to ∞. 
Let pCt(Qi|en) indicate 
nti + /k
n + 
, to be called the Carnapian precursor of the pn-truth. The Carnapian 
precursor at time n is the probability of the next event that would be assigned by the ‘λ-rule’ (1C) if 
the observed frequency would coincide with the true probability. As is easy to check, the precursor 
trivially approaches the pn-truth stepwise. What we can prove is (Theorem 3) that for every 
significance level ε > 0 and for sufficiently many trials the probability that ‘later’ Carnapian pn-
theories deviate ε-significantly from the Carnapian precursor of the pn-truth is smaller than that this 
happens for ‘earlier’ ones. We will call this the ‘decreasing significant deviation’-theorem. 
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We do not exclude that it is even possible to prove that in the long run there is, at least more 
often than not, stepwise approximation to the precursor of the pn-truth and, as said already, this 
precursor goes stepwise to the pn-truth. If it is possible to prove the suggested conjecture, we might be 
inclined to conclude, by asymptotic reasoning, that in the long run ‘later’ Carnapian pn-theories are at 
least more often than not closer to the pn-truth than ‘earlier’ ones, and that the failures become fewer 
as n increases. However, being closer to the corresponding precursor does not guarantee being closer 




Theorem 3: Decreasing significant deviation. For every significance level ε > 0 holds, for 
sufficiently large n, that the probability that the nth Carnapian prediction deviates from the 
n
th 
Carnapian pn-truth-precursor ε-significantly is larger than the probability that the 
(n+1)
th
 Carnapian prediction deviates ε-significantly from the (n+1)th Carnapian pn-truth-
precursor. 
∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 1∀n ≥ N  Probt (|pC(Qi|en+1) – pCt(Qi|en+1)| > ε)  <  Probt (|pC(Qi|en) – pCt(Qi|en)| > ε)  
where 	




  , the Carnapian precursor of the pn-truth, and ti is the limit of ni/n as n tends to infinity 
(it is assumed that this limit exists, and that ni/n has a binomial distribution with mean ti and 
variance ti(1-ti)). 
 
An easy to prove consequence is that this not only holds for the next experiment but even more so for 
a number of new experiments: 
 
Corollary 3.1: For every significance level ε > 0 and m>0 holds, for sufficiently large n, that 
the probability that the n
th
 Carnapian prediction deviates from the n
th 
Carnapian pn-truth-
precursor ε-significantly is larger than the probability that the (n+m)th Carnapian prediction 
deviates ε-significantly from the (n+m)th Carnapian pn-truth-precursor. 
∀ ε > 0 ∃ N ≥ 1 ∀ n ≥ N  ∀ m ≥ 1:  
Probt (|pC(Qi|en+m) – pCt(Qi|en+m)| > ε) <  Probt (|pC(Qi|en) – pCt(Qi|en)| > ε)  
 
There is even a lower bound (lb) to the relevant difference in Theorem 3, which makes (the decreasing 
significant deviation) Theorem 3 and Corollary 3.1 even more compelling.  
 
Corollary 3.2: There is a well-defined lower bound pertaining to Theorem 3 
                                                            
5
 For a counterexample to the suggested conjecture see the Appendix, between the proofs of Theorem 2 and 3. 
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∀ ε > 0 ∃ N ≥ 1∀ n ≥ N ∃ lbi(n) > 0 
Probt (|pC(Qi|en) – pCt(Qi|en)| > ε) –  Probt (|pC(Qi|en+1) – pCt(Qi|en+1)| > ε) > lbi(n), 
 where lbi(n) is a positive lower bound, depending on n, whose value is stated in the proof. 
 
For the proofs of Theorem 3 and the corollaries, see the Appendix. 
 
One might think that a stronger form of Theorem 3 must be provable, that is, that there is always 
stepwise approximation of the true probability, but the proof of Theorem 3 makes clear that this 
stronger claim does not hold. However, in terms of expected values the intuition is perfectly true.   
 
Theorem 4: In a Carnap-system the expected value of the distance |pC(Qi|en) − ti| goes 
stepwise to 0 (or is and remains 0 when ti is 1/k) 
 
For the proof, see the Appendix. Direct consequences of this theorem are that the expected value of the 
city-block (total) distance Σ|pC(Qi|en) −ti| from the truth and the expected value of the Euclidean (total) 
distance from the truth, i.e. (Σ(pC(Qi|en)−ti)
2
)
1/2, go also stepwise to zero. 




4. The deterministic nomic truth and deterministic nomic theories approaching it 
 
4.1 Deterministic nomic theories, qualitative evidence, and their relation 
This section deals, among other things, with Option 1, non-probabilistically approaching a 
deterministic nomic truth. In the previous sections we studied a multinomial context in terms of 
probabilities, the probabilistic level. We could also have started with the deterministic level as follows. 
Given is a quasi-multinomial context: an experimental device enabling successive experiments with a 
finite set of conceptually possible elementary outcomes, i.e. K = {Q1, Q2,.…Qk}. Let T indicate the 
(unknown) subset of nomically (e.g. physically) possible (observable) outcomes (∅ ≠ T ⊆ K).  
A deterministic theory HV, for ∅≠V⊆K, claims that for a specified subset V V=T holds.
6 HV is 
the multinomial analogue of a so-called ‘(monadic) constituent’, which claims that in a given universe 
of objects precisely the ‘Q-predicates’ in V are exemplified. Deterministic theories are deterministic 
just because they are non-probabilistic statements, being true or false. Of course, HT is the true 
deterministic theory, i.e. the deterministic truth. Note that the claim V=T of theory HV is a complete 
                                                            
6
 In the terminology of (Kuipers, 2019) this is a maximal claim. 
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answer to the cognitive problem: “Which conceptually possible outcomes have positive probability?” 
Hence, these theories are mutually incompatible and, in a generalized sense, of equal logical strength.  
 We define the (qualitative) ∆-distance between deterministic theories HV and HW, D(HV, HW), 
as the symmetric difference between V and W: D(HV, HW) =df (V−W)∪(W−V) =df V∆W. Now it is 
plausible to define “HW is ∆-closer to the true deterministic theory T than HV” by the condition W∆T⊂ 
V∆T. 
 Later on, in the context of Hintikka-systems, we will introduce what we call a ‘probabilified-
deterministic’ theory: a prior distribution over the relevant deterministic theories: for a non-empty 
subset V of K we then have p(HV) = p(V=T) such that 0≤p(HV)<1 and Σp(HV)=1.  
 Recall that en reports the ordered sequence of outcomes of the first n experiments. Let R(en) = 
Rn report the set of realized or exemplified outcomes in the first n experiments, hence, Rn ⊆ T. Rn is 
called the qualitative evidence. Under plausible assumptions, Rn ‘increases’. More precisely, if 
outcomes are correctly registered, Rn necessarily is a subset of T and it can only expand: Rn ⊆ Rn+m. 
Moreover, in a genuine multinomial context, Rn goes to T when n goes to ∞, see Theorem 6 below. 
 As is easy to check,   is at least as ∆-close to HT as . Consequently, if Rn is a proper 
subset of Rn+m,   is relative to a case of non-probabilistic approximation of the deterministic 
nomic truth, i.e. Option 1. However, these theories are not very interesting, they are just ad hoc 
constructions. 
Similarly, truth approximation can also be guaranteed by revision of a deterministic theory in 
the following way (Kuipers, 2019, Ch. 15): ∪is at least as ∆-close to HT as HV, which is due to Rn 
being a subset of T. However, such revisions are also rather ad hoc.  
 We define “HW is relative to Rn at least as successful as HV” iff (Rn∩V)⊆(Rn∩W). Note that 
this is equivalent to Rn−W ⊆ Rn−V, that is, all counterexamples of HW are counterexamples of HV. In 
my work on the approximation of deterministic (nomic) truths, notably (Kuipers, 2000, 2019), the so-
called success theorem is a kind of backbone. The following (easy to prove) theorem is a special case7:   
 
 Theorem 5: Deterministic Success Theorem 
If HW is ∆-closer to HT than HV then HW is always at least as successful as HV and (under 
genuine multinomial conditions) more successful in the long run. 
 
Quantitative versions of the comparative deterministic notions ‘∆-closer to’ and ‘at least as successful’ 
can easily be given (Kuipers, 2019, Ch. 5). 
The aim to prove something like Theorem 5 for probabilistically approaching a deterministic 
nomic truth, Option 3, will play a guiding role in Section 6. 
                                                            
7
 To be precise, it neglects evidence in terms of empirical laws induced on the basis of Rn (Kuipers, 2000, Ch. 7; 




4.2 Some relations between deterministic and probabilistic levels 
To clarify the relevant notions, we will specify some of the relations between deterministic and 
probabilistic level. Here we assume throughout a genuine multinomial context, i.e. the successive 
outcomes of the experiment are probabilistically independent and have a fixed probability. 
Recall: 
Set of deterministic theories:  H = {HV | ∅ ⊂ V ⊆ K}   The deterministic truth: HT 
Set of probabilistic theories:  F =df {x | x∈ [0, 1)
k 
,  xi = 1}  The probabilistic truth: t 
We will assume that there are no nomically possible outcomes with zero probability, i.e. Qi∈T iff ti>0, 
and T = {Qi|ti>0}.   
 Given a probabilistic theory x, then Hπ(x), with π(x) =df {Qi|xi > 0}, is of course the 
corresponding deterministic theory. In particular, π(t) = T. Note that a deterministic theory 
corresponds to numerous probabilistic theories (it is a one-many relation). In some formal detail:  
 π: F → H    projection function: π(x) =df {Qi|xi > 0} 
 π−1:  H → ℘(F) − {∅}  reproduction function: π−1(HV)=df {x ∈F | π(x) =V} 
     where ℘(F) is the powerset of F. 
It is interesting to note that π−1 leads to a partition of F. Hence it is impossible that for some V and W 




(HV)” holds, even if HW is ∆-closer to HT than HV. 
  
Regarding evidence, recall: 
Qualitative evidence: Rn: the set of realized or exemplified outcomes in the first n experiments: 
hence, Rn ⊆ T.  
 Quantitative evidence: en reports the ordered outcomes of the first n experiments, ni the 
 number of Qi-occurrences. 
Of course, we have the following relation: Rn = R(en) =df {Qi|ni>0}. As already noted, assuming ni>0 
entails ti>0, then R(en) goes to T when n goes to ∞, see Theorem 6 below.  
 
 
5. Hintikkian updating of a probabilified deterministic theory and its corresponding 
probabilistic theory, based on conditional Carnapian updating 
This section deals primarily with a first attempt to realize Option 3, probabilistically approaching a 
deterministic nomic truth, a problematic Hintikkian way, but in the same go also with a clear case of 






In (Kuipers, 1978) I introduced so-called Hintikka-systems of inductive probability, a generalization 
of the kind of systems that Hintikka (1966) introduced earlier.  
We assume a multinomial context. We will call a probability distribution over the possible 
deterministic theories ‘Probabilified-Deterministic’ (PD-) theory. We start with assuming a Prior PD-
theory: let V be a non-empty subset of K, then p(HV) = p(V=T), such that 0≤p(HV)≤1 and Σp(HV)=1. 
A plausible special kind of prior distribution is that only size matters: p(HV) = p(Hw) = p(Hv) if 
|V|=|W|=v. Originally Hintikka introduced a still more specific prior distribution which is here not 
relevant. 
To complete Hintikka-systems, we introduce conditional Carnapian values (conditional C-
values, see (1C), Section 3), assuming, ∅ ≠ V⊆ K, R(en) ⊆ V and Qi ∈V:  
pC(Qi|HV&en) =  
ni + /
n +      (|V|=v; 0< λV  <∞) 
Note that, restricted to Qi ∈V, they sum up to 1.  
Again we have the similar special case for the parameter that only size matters: λV = λ|V| =λv. 
In this case we have at least two interesting special subcases:   
1) λv = λ; this was generally assumed by Hintikka 
2) λv = vρ, 0<ρ<∞; this holds in so-called special H-systems
8
 (Kuipers, 1978). 
 
By applying Bayes’ theorem, the combination of a prior PD-theory and conditional C-values naturally 
leads to the corresponding Posterior PD-theory: p(HV|en) = p(HV)pC(en|HV) / p(en), where p(en) = 
   p(HW)pC(en|HW). 
Here, pC(en|HV) is of course to be calculated with the product rule applied to the successive conditional 
C-values. Note that the summation of p(en) needs only to take supersets of R(en) into account, because 
pC(en|HW) is of course 0 otherwise. 
The combination of the posterior PD-theory and the relevant conditional C-values, leads to a 
corresponding probabilistic theory: the Posterior probabilistic theory (of Hintikka- or H-values): 
pH(Qi|en) = Σ V⊇R(en) p(HV|en) pC(Qi|HV&en). 
 
5.2 Limit behavior of H-systems 
In the present context, the limit behaviors of p(HV|en) and pH(Qi|en) of H-systems are of course the 
crucial questions. In the following we do not make any special case assumption. There are three 
theorems of which the third is a trivial consequence of the second (Theorem 7) and Theorem 2. 
We begin with a general theorem that is also important for the next section.  
 
Theorem 6: In a multinomial context all nomic possibilities are realized, with probability 1  
                                                            
8
 They turn out to be equivalent to a prima facie totally different kind of so-called Niiniluoto-Hintikka-systems. 
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R(en) approaches T (R(en) → T) (stepwise) with probability 1 for n → ∞. 
Formally: Probt [limn→∞ (R(en) = T)] = 1, i.e. Probt [∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N (R(en) = T)] = 1 
 
The formal proof is in the Appendix. 
This theorem is in fact well-known: in a binomial case both outcomes will, with probability 1, 
show up sooner or later because they have a positive probability. The trivial consequence, stated in the 
theorem, is that this also holds in the multinomial case for all nomically possible (observable) 
outcomes are assumed to have positive probability; of course, they show up one at a time (i.e. 
stepwise).  
Note that this theorem reports a kind of objective probabilistically based approximation of the 
deterministic truth HT associated with T, that is, a kind of Option 3: (objective) probabilistic 
approximation of a deterministic truth.9  
 The next theorem is also crucial: 
 
Theorem 7: Hintikka-systems converge to the deterministic truth with probability 1 
In an H-system the posterior probability of HV gradually (but not necessarily stepwise) 
approaches 1 with probability 1 when HV is the deterministic truth, and it may suddenly fall 
down to 0 or gradually approach 0 otherwise.  
Briefly, if n → ∞ then, with probability 1, p(HV|en) → 1 if V=T, otherwise →  0 (the latter as 
soon as R(en) − V ≠ ∅, if T−V ≠ ∅, or gradually, if V ⊃ T). 
Formally, Probt [limn → ∞ p(HT|en) = 1] = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |p(HT|en) − 1| < ε] 
=1, and, for V ≠ T, Probt [limn → ∞ p(HV|en) = 0] = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  p(HV|en) < 
ε] =1 (where in the latter case p(HV|en) drops to 0 as soon as R(en) − V ≠ ∅, if T−V ≠ ∅, or 
gradually, if V ⊃ T). 
 
For the proof, see the Appendix. It is important to know that the proof of Theorem 7 is strongly based 
on Theorem 6 (R(en) → T (stepwise) with probability 1 for n → ∞). 
At first sight, Theorem 7 again seems to state a straightforward case of probabilistic 
approximation of a deterministic truth, i.e. Option 3. However, in the next section we will start with 
questioning this qualification. 
  
Theorem 8: Hintikka-systems converge to the probabilistic truth with probability 1 
 The posterior probability Qi approaches the true probability of Qi with probability 1. 
Formally, Probt (lim n→∞ pH(Qi|en) = ti) = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |pH(Qi|en) – ti| < ε] = 
1  
                                                            
9 Note that, in view of Theorem 6, revision ∗=df  goes with probability 1 to HV∪T. 
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Theorem 8 directly follows from Theorem 7 and the fact that pC(Qi|HT&en) → ti, which is an adapted 
version of Theorem 2, i.e. applied to conditional C-systems. Theorem 8 states a case of gradual 
probabilistic approximation of a probabilistic truth, again a clear case of realizing Option 2, the, 
conditional, Hintikkian way. We leave the question whether it is possible to prove something like (the 
decreasing significant deviation) Theorem 3, like in the case of Carnap-systems, for further research.  
 
  
6. Option 3: Probabilistically approaching a deterministic truth 
This section deals with a second, more adequate, attempt to realize Option 3, probabilistically 
approaching a deterministic nomic truth, to be called the Hintikka-Niiniluoto way. Recall that 
Theorem 7 states: if n → ∞ then p(HV|en) → 1 if V=T, otherwise → 0, the latter suddenly as soon as 
R(en) −V ≠ ∅, if T−V ≠ ∅, or gradually, if V⊃T. The cases V=T and V⊃T are defensibly described as 
cases of truth approximation. However, in the third case, when T − V ≠ ∅, p(HV|en) will sooner or later 
suddenly fall down from some positive value to 0, viz. when R(en) becomes such that R(en) − V ≠ ∅, 
that is, as soon as a counterexample to HV appears. This goes against the basic intuition that though the 
probability of a hypothesis may well be confronted with this fate, it is problematic from the point of 
view of verisimilitude. For the falsified hypothesis, more generally, any false hypothesis may well be 
close to the truth. This is one of the main reasons for Popper’s claim that probability and verisimilitude 
are quite different concepts. 
This is also the reason why the following tentative probabilistic success theorem is 
problematic. Let us consider conditional Carnap-systems and call HW more successful relative to en 
than HV iff pC(en|HW) > pC(en|HV). Assuming that λ is constant, it is now easy to prove that if T ⊂ W ⊂ 
V, and hence HW is ∆-closer to HT than HV, then HT is always more successful than HW, and HW is 
always more successful than HV. The crucial point is that, in calculating pC(en|HX) for X = T, W and V, 
respectively, the numerators of the corresponding C-values, i.e. ni + λ/t , ni + λ/w, and ni + λ/v, are 
decreasing, due to t < w < v, while their denominators are the same, viz. n + λ. However, this does not 
work out nicely for other cases of HW being ∆-closer to HT than HV, for if T − W ≠ ∅ we may have T − 
R(en) ≠ ∅, in which case we get 0 probability for pC(en|HW) and hence the likelihood is no longer a 
sophisticated measure of the success of HW.  
Note that an attractive point of the present definition of ‘more successful’ in the context of the 
tentative success theorem is that it is not laden with the notion of nomic truth, let alone nomic 
truthlikeness. This feature is typical for success theorems, like Theorem 5, in the context of non-
probabilistic approximation of deterministic truths. Unfortunately, we did not find a probabilistic 
definition of ‘more successful’ that is independent of a truthlikeness definition, but nevertheless 
enabling some kind of probabilistic success theorem. 
16 
 
However, apart from this ladenness problem, we can get a very nice kind of success theorem 
in terms of Ilkka Niiniluoto’s (1987) notion of ‘estimated distance from the truth’. For this purpose we 
need a distance function between subsets of K. Let d(V, W) be a real-valued normalized metric, i.e. a 
distance function satisfying the standard conditions: 0 ≤ d(V, W) ≤ 1, d(V, W) = 0 iff V=W, d(V, W) = 
d(W, V), and d(V, W) ≤ d(V, X) + d(X, W). A plausible metric in the present case is the size distance, 
i.e. the normalized size of the symmetric difference: d∆(V,W) =df |V∆W|/|K|. Whatever d is, we assume 
that if HW is ∆-closer to HT than HV (i.e. if W∆T⊂ V∆T then d(V, T) ≥ d(W, T)), which is trivially the 
case for the suggested quantitative version of the symmetric distance, d∆.  
We need the following definitions. 
1. HW is d-closer to HT than HV iff d(W, T) < d(V, T).  
2. Estimated Distance from the Truth (HV|en) = EDT(HV|en) =  p(HX|en) d(V, X).  
3. HW is estimated to be d-closer to the truth than HV in view of en: EDT(HW|en) < 
EDT(HV|en). 
Note that the last notion is via EDT not only probabilistic but also substantially laden with the notion 
of nomic truth, and even with a specific version of the idea of nomic truthlikeness, viz. in terms of a 
distance function from, in particular, the possible nomic truth.  
 Note also that Theorem 7 (if n → ∞ then, with probability 1, p(HV|en) → 1 if V=T, otherwise 
→  0) has now an immediate corollary. 
 
Corollary 7.1: EDT(V|en) converges with probability 1 to d(V, T) 
Formally: Probt [lim n→ω EDT(V|en) = d(V, T)] =1,  
i.e. Probt [∀ε>0 ∃N≥0 ∀n≥N |EDT(V|en) − d(V, T)| < ε] =1   
 
Recall that the proof of Theorem 7 is strongly based on Theorem 6 (R(en) → T, with probability 1), 
which is based on the true distribution Probt.  
 
 Theorem 9: Deterministic-Probabilistic Quasi-Success Theorem (DPQ-Success Theorem) 
If HW is d-closer to the deterministic truth HT than HV (by assumption entailed by ‘∆-closer 
to‘) then with probability 1 HW will in the long run be estimated to be d-closer to the truth than 
HV ((EDT(HW|en) < EDT(HV|en)).  
Formally:  
if d(W, T) < d(V, T) then Probt [limn →∞ (EDT(HW|en) < EDT(HV|en))] = 1,  
i.e. Probt [∀ε>0 ∃N≥0 ∀n≥N (EDT(HV|en) − EDT(HW|en)) > ε] = 1 
 
For the proof of Theorem 9, see the Appendix. It is strongly based on Corollary 7.1. 
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Our claim is that this DPQ-Success Theorem may be seen as the core of genuine probabilistic 
approximation of the deterministic truth (HT) in the present context, viz. by decreasing (probabilistic) 
EDT, i.e. Option 3, the Hintikka-Niiniluoto way. The reasoning behind this claim is an adapted 
version of the reasoning behind the claim that the deterministic success theorem (Theorem 5) is the 
core of deterministic truth approximation by increasing empirical success (e.g. Kuipers, 2019, p. 57):  
• Assuming that HW is at a certain moment estimated to be d-closer to the truth HT than HV, 
propose and test the ‘probabilistic empirical progress (PEP-)hypothesis’: HW (is and) remains 
(at least in the long run) estimated to be d-closer to the truth than HV. 
• Assuming that after ‘sufficient confirmation’ the PEP-hypothesis is accepted (for the time 
being), argue on the basis of DPQ-Success Theorem to what extent the ‘truth approximation 
(TA-)hypothesis’, that is, HW is d-closer to the truth HT than HV, is the best explanation for this 
case of probabilistic empirical progress, i.e., that this is a case of probabilistic approximation 
of a deterministic truth. 
• Abductively conclude (for the time being) that HW is d-closer to the truth HT than HV, i.e., that 





7. Concluding remarks 
In the introduction we distinguished three options:  
Option 1. Non-probabilistically approaching a deterministic nomic truth 
Option 2. Probabilistically approaching a probabilistic nomic truth  
Option 3. Probabilistically approaching a deterministic nomic truth 
We may conclude that all three options make perfect sense in a multinomial context. It is plausible to 
expect that this is also the case in other well-defined probabilistic contexts. It may well be 
enlightening to elaborate the options in some detail in one or more of these other contexts. 
Hence, we may conclude that, as already anticipated by Festa (1993), the (realist) truth 
approximation perspective on Carnap- and Hintikka-systems leads to the unification of the inductive 
probability field (formally, in their style) and the field of truth approximation.  
                                                            
10
 There is a quite different variant of Option 3, viz. approaching a ‘deterministic nomic truth’ in a probabilistic, 
more specifically, measure-theoretical way. Ch. 5 and Ch. 13 of (Kuipers, 2019) deal with it. Ch. 5 provides a 
quantitative, measure-theoretical version of basic, qualitative approximation of the (deterministic) nomic truth. 
Ch. 13, entitled “Empirical Progress and Nomic Truth Approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic 
Method’” builds on this. The crucial difference is that the latter assumes a deterministic context with a 
straightforward deterministic truth, that is, unlike the present paper, there is no underlying probability process 




The present paper leaves several questions for further research. Among others, there is the 
question whether the convergence to the probabilistic truth (Section 5, Theorem 8) of Hintikka-
systems, like Theorem 3 in the case of Carnap-systems, may also be a matter of ‘decreasing significant 
deviation’. Moreover, in Section 6, we found a nice kind of success theorem in terms of Ilkka 
Niiniluoto’s (1987) notion of ‘estimated distance from the truth’. However, that notion is laden with 
the notion of nomic truth. Is there a notion of ‘more successful’ that is not laden with that notion and 
nevertheless enables an interesting success theorem? Finally, there is the plausible connecting question 
whether the way in which Hintikka-systems realize Option 3 can be conceived as an extension or 
concretization of qualitatively approaching the deterministic nomic truth, i.e. Option 1. 
It may be illuminating to pay some attention to the well-known distinction between content 
and likeness definitions of verisimilitude/ truthlikeness, introduced by Sjoerd Zwart (2001) (see also 
Oddie, 2016) and, related, the distinction between theories with the same versus different logical 
strength. These distinctions were not yet relevant for the present paper for the following reasons. As 
said before, the paper is in fact restricted to, following the terminology of Niiniluoto (1987), truth 
approximation between complete answers to a cognitive problem, i.e. the problem which complete 
answer is the true one? As far as the logical problem of verisimilitude is concerned the first, in a sense 
elementary, question is e.g. which of two (conceptually) relevant propositional or monadic 
constituents is closer to the truth, i.e. the true constituent? Similarly, which of two relevant probability 
distributions is closer to the truth, i.e. the true distribution? In these terms and assuming a realist 
perspective we focussed on Carnap-systems in view of one cognitive problem, viz. which multinomial 
probability distribution is (closer to) the true one. Next we focussed on Hintikka-systems in view of 
two cognitive problems, the one mentioned, and the cognitive problem of which (analogue of a 
monadic) constituent is (closer to) the true one. In many contexts there are plausible qualitative or 
quantitative answers to these logical questions, e.g. based on a plausible distance function between 
complete answers, e.g. the city-block distance between distributions and the size distance between 
constituents.11  
The compound, or, if you wish, ‘hard’ logical problem of verisimilitude, however, is how to 
extend solutions for complete answers to incomplete answers to the cognitive problem: e.g. sets (e.g. 
intervals) of probability distributions, disjunctions of constituents and the like. This compound logical 
problem is not touched upon in the present paper, neither for the cognitive problem of the true 
distribution, nor for that of the true constituent. However, the mentioned distinctions (content vs 
                                                            
11
 Of course, something like the distinction between content and likeness definitions could already be brought 
into play by the definition of ‘∆-closer to’ between constituents, but the (more or less) standard definition of the 
distinction in terms of whether the logically stronger false theory is closer to the true one than the weaker theory, 
or vice versa, does of course not work for complete answers. In my view the distinction can best be made in 
terms of whether the definition of ‘Y is closer to T than X’ is merely a matter of set comparisons (as in the case 
‘∆-closer to’ and the corresponding size distance) or that it includes distance considerations between members of 




likeness definitions and equal vs different logical strength
12
), can and will certainly play an important 
role in research devoted to the two compound problems.      
To be sure, our main concern was not the (elementary) logical but the elementary epistemic 
problem of verisimilitude, that is, more specifically: the comparative evaluation on the basis of 
evidence of complete answers to the two relevant cognitive problems with regard to the aim of truth 
approximation. Again, the extension to the two relevant compound epistemic problems, including the 
role of the two distinctions, is an interesting challenge. 
 
 
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 
 
Theorem 1: Restricted Expected (Probabilistic-)Success Theorem 
If y is relative to Qi closer to the pn-truth than x if and only if it may be expected that en is such that y 
is relative to Qi more successful than x. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
In fact we are dealing with three binomial distributions, <xi, 1-xi>, <yi, 1-yi> and <ti, 1-ti>, for which 
the probability that the first n experiments result in ni(en) = m according to e.g. <xi, 1-xi>,  i. e. 
 , !(ni(en) = m), equals "#$%
#1 − %
 #. Regarding the true distribution <ti, 1-ti> it is well-
known that the mean, i.e. the expected value of the relative frequency, E(ni/n), equals ti and the 
variance, i.e. the expected value of the square of the distance of the relative frequency from the true 
probability, i.e. E((ni/n − ti)
2
), equals ti(1 − ti). Crucial for the theorem is the quasi-variance relative to 
xi, i.e. the expected value E((ni/n − xi)
2
), and similarly for yi. 
 E((ni/n − xi)
2
)  = E((ni/n − ti + ti − xi)
2
)  
= E((ni/n − ti)
2
) + 2(ti − xi)E(ni/n − ti) + (ti − xi)
2
  
= ti(1 − ti) + (ti − xi)
2. 
The last step uses the variance and the fact that E(ni/n − ti) is of course 0 in view of the mean value.  
Similarly we have:  
 E((ni/n − yi)
2
)  = ti(1 − ti) + (ti − yi)
2. 
Hence, E((ni/n − yi)
2
) < E((ni/n − xi)
2
) if and only if (ti − yi)
2
 < (ti − xi)
2. Qed. 
 
Theorem 2: Carnap-systems converge to the probabilistic nomic truth 
Informally, the Carnapian updating of the initial pn-theory approaches the pn-truth with probability 1. 
                                                            
12 In a generalized sense we may say that the relevant distributions and constituents, respectively, are of equal 
logical strength. Note that the relevant constituents are in fact propositional constituents, viz. conjunctions of 
negated and un-negated positive probability claims with respect to all Q-predicates. 
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Formally: Probt (lim n→∞ pC(Qi|en) = ti) = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |pC(Qi|en) – ti| < ε] = 1,  
i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N |
ni + /k
n + 
  – ti| < ε)] = 1 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. 
The theorem follows directly from the fact that, step 1, the Carnapian prediction function converges 
with certainty to the relative frequency 
ni
n
, and, step 2,  the strong law of large numbers
13
, according to 
which the limit of the relative frequency of a series of independent experiments with a fixed 
probability equals the true probability with probability 1,  
Formally: Step 1 limn→∞ pC(Qi|en) = limn→∞ 
ni + /k
n + 
  =  
ni
n
   
i.e. ∀ε > 0∃N ≥ 0∀n ≥ N  |pC(Qi|en) – ni/n| (= | 
ni + /k
n + 
  – 
ni
n






 –  
ni
n
| < ε 
Step 2 Probt [limn→∞ 
ni
n
  = ti] = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |ni/n – ti| < ε] = 1. Qed. 
 
Counterexample to the suggested conjecture in the following claim (see Note 3 before Theorem 3): 
Being closer to the corresponding precursor does not guarantee being closer to the true value, even 
though that precursor is closer to the true value. 
 
Recall the definitions of the Carnapian value and the Carnapian precursor: 
	
|= ni + /kn +   = pi  pCt(Qi|en) = nti + /kn +   = ci 
Let en+1 be such that ni(en+1) = ni(en) = ni, hence, the (n+1)
th trial does not result in Qi, then 
	
|(= ni + /kn + 1 +  = pi’  pCt(Qi|en+1) = (n + 1) ti + /kn + 1 +   = ci’ 
Let 1/k < ti. The question is whether it is possible to construe a case, with k, ti, and λ, such that for all 
n there is a ni resulting in four values in the following order in the [0, 1] interval:  
0 − − − 1* − − − +
 − − − −+
, − − − −
, − − − 
 − − − -
 − − − − − −1 
For in this case pi’ is further from the truth than pi but closer to ci’ than pi is to ci.  
Proof: Note first that ci and ci’ trivially are in the open interval (1/k, ti) and that ci < ci’, hence the 
(n+1)th precursor is closer to ti than the n
th. Note also that pi’< pi trivially holds. Hence, what further is 




 <  ni n + 1    or, equivalently, / + 1-
 <  /
 < / +  )-
 −   /k  
                                                            
13
 See e.g. Feller (1968
3
), section VIII.4. 
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For k=2, ti = ¾, and =100 the condition amounts to 12 + 12 <  /
 <  12 + 25. Choosing ni equal to 
 12 + 1, if that is an integer, and, if not, as the nearest integer above it, will do for all n. Note that we 
did not need to assume that ni/n is smaller than ti.  




[Technical notes regarding the proofs of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3.2 in the appendix:  
- Sometimes ‘t’ appears below in 6789 without underlining, whereas it should be.   
- Some occurrences of the integral sign ´: ´ might better be larger, without enlarging the 
corresponding sub- and superscripts.  
- Some brackets of the form ‘(‘and ‘)’ might better be larger, without enlarging the other 
symbols around.  
The relevant occurrences have been marked by green] 
 
 
Theorem 3: Decreasing significant deviation For every significance level ε > 0 holds, for 
sufficiently large n, that the probability that the n
th
 Carnapian prediction deviates from the n
th 
Carnapian pn-truth-precursor ε-significantly is larger than the probability that the (n+1)th 
Carnapian prediction deviates ε-significantly from the (n+1)th Carnapian pn-truth-precursor. 
∀ ε > 0 ∃ N ≥ 1∀ n ≥ N : Probt (|pC(Qi|en+1) – pCt(Qi|en+1)| > ε)  <  Probt (|pC(Qi|en) – pCt(Qi|en)| > ε)  
where  	
| =  nn +     + n +     = ni + /kn +   , the Carnapian value, and  	
| =  + /kn +    , the 
Carnapian precursor of the pn-truth, and ti is the limit of ni/n as n tends to infinity (it is assumed that 
this limit exists, and that ni/n has a binomial distribution with mean ti and variance ti(1-ti)). 
 
Proof of Theorem 3 
Note first that 	
| −  	
| =   n +  =  
  
n + 
 . The mean is of course 0 and the 
variance is < 
n + 
=> times the variance of   , which is -
1 − -
, hence  < n + => -
1 − -
.  However, 
we may also note that 	
| − 	
| =    n +    goes to < − -
= for n going to ∞, with 
mean 0 and variance -
1 − -
.] 
Note now that, for mutually independent random variables Xj, j = 1,2,...,n, each with mean µ 
and standard deviation σ, the Central Limit Theorem (Feller, 1968
3
, Section X.1) states that  
 
∑ @ A@BCD√  
22 
 
is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 ℵ0, 1 in the limit of large n. Hence, if 
the Xj are binomially distributed, with Xj = 1 for a ‘head’ and Xj = 0 for a ‘tail’, and ∑ GH =  /
HI , 
then we know that asymptotically  
JK JLKMJLKN LK =  
JJKJ  LKMJLKN LK  and hence, see above  
OPQ| OPRQ|M   
has the normal distribution ℵ0, 1. 
 Hence, for large n, and for S > 0, 
 
 Probt ( T    (	
| − 	
| >  S  ~ √>W : X%  Y >⁄[\    . 
 
Define 
 ] =  T   S , 
so that Probt (|	
| − 	
|| >  ]  ~ >√>W : X%  Y >⁄[T RC^R _    , 
where the factor of 2 arises because both tails of the distribution have now been included. Therefore 
       ∗  6789|(	
| − 	
|| >  ] − 6789|(	
|( −  	
|(| >  ]  




which is positive, thus proving Theorem 3. Qed. 
 
Corollary 3.1: For every significance level ε > 0 and m>0 holds, for sufficiently large n, that the 
probability that the nth Carnapian prediction deviates from the nth Carnapian pn-truth-precursor ε-
significantly is larger than the probability that the (n+m)
th
 Carnapian prediction deviates ε-
significantly from the (n+m)th Carnapian pn-truth-precursor. 
∀ ε > 0 ∃ N ≥ 1 ∀ n ≥ N  ∀ m ≥ 1:  
Probt (|pC(Qi|en+m) – pCt(Qi|en+m)| > ε) <  Probt (|pC(Qi|en) – pCt(Qi|en)| > ε)  
 
Proof of Corollary 3.1: It follows directly by concatenating the result of the theorem. 
 
Corollary 3.2: There is a well-defined lower bound pertaining to Theorem 3 
∀ ε > 0 ∃ N ≥ 1∀ n ≥ N ∃ lbi(n) > 0  
Probt (|pC(Qi|en) – pCt(Qi|en)| > ε) –  Probt (|pC(Qi|en+1) – pCt(Qi|en+1)| > ε) > lbi(n), 
where lbi(n) is a positive lower bound, depending on n, whose value is stated in the proof. 
 
Proof of Corollary 3.2: 
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Such a lower bound on the relevant difference (*) in the proof of Theorem 3 can be obtained by 
minorizing the exponential in the integrand.  
 
For large n, 
    ∗  6789|(	
| −  	
|| >  ] − 6789|(	
|( − 	
|(| >  ]  
~ a2b c X%  Y >⁄
T (  _
T   _
  




 c X% 
a (   _
T     _
 






 [√/ + 1 − √/ 







1√/ + 1 + √/ 




 ]M/ + 1-
1 − -
 . Qed. 
 
Theorem 4: In a Carnap-system the expected value of the distance |pC(Qi|en) − ti| goes stepwise to 0 
(or is and remains 0 when ti is 1/k) 
  
Proof of Theorem 4: 




 ) = 
E(ni)+ /k
n + 





1) If ti<1/k, E( 
ni + /k
n + 
  − ti) = 
nti + /k
n + 
  − 
ti (n + )
n + 
  = 
(1/k   ti) 
n + 
  > 
(1/k  ti) 
n +1 +    →  0  
That is, the expected value of the relevant distance is monotone decreasingly approaching 0. 
2) If ti>1/k, similarly, but now monotone increasingly approaching 0. 
3) If ti =1/k, the expected value of the distance is constant, viz. 0. Qed. 
 
Theorem 6: In a multinomial context all nomic possibilities are realized, with probability 1  
R(en) approaches T (R(en) → T) (stepwise) with probability 1 for n → ∞. 
Formally: Probt [limn→∞ (R(en) = T)] = 1, i.e. Probt [∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N (R(en) = T)] = 1 
 
Proof of Theorem 6: 
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From Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2 (based on the strong law of large numbers), we get:  
 for all i Probt [limn→∞ 
ni
n
  = ti] = 1, i.e. ∀i Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |ni/n – ti| < ε] = 1. 
Let I(T) indicate {i|ti > 0} = {i|Qi ∈T} and let t* indicate the smallest non-zero ti, i.e. min{ti| i ∈ I(T)}. 
Then we may conclude:  
∀i ∈ I(T)  Probt [limn→∞ 
ni
n
  > 0] = 1, i.e. ∀i ∈I (T) Probt [∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  
ni
n
 > 0] = 1, 
the latter via ∀i ∈ I(T) Probt [∀ε∈ (0, t*) ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  ( ni
n
  >  ti – ε)] = 1. 
Hence, since p(A&B)=1 if p(A)=1=p(B), 
Probt ∀i ∈ I(T) [limn→∞ 
ni
n
  > 0] = 1, i.e. Probt [∀i ∈ I(T)∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  
ni
n
 > 0] = 1. 
Hence, since ni/n>0 entails ni > 0, which entails Qi in R(en), 
Probt [limn→∞ (R(en) = T] = 1, i.e. Probt [∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N R(en) = T] = 1, 
the latter via Probt [∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N ∀i ∈ I(T) 
ni
n
  > 0] = 1.  
That the members of T show up one at a time (stepwise) is trivial. Qed. 
 
Theorem 7: Hintikka-systems converge to the deterministic truth with probability 1 
In an H-system the posterior probability of HV gradually (but not necessarily stepwise) approaches 1 
with probability 1 when HV is the deterministic truth, and it may suddenly fall down to 0 or gradually 
approach 0 otherwise.  
Briefly, if n → ∞ then, with probability 1, p(HV|en) → 1 if V=T, otherwise →  0 (the latter as soon as 
R(en) − V ≠ ∅, if T−V ≠ ∅, or gradually, if V ⊃ T). 
Formally, Probt [limn → ∞ p(HT|en) = 1] = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  |p(HT|en) − 1| < ε] =1, and, 
for V ≠ T, Probt [limn → ∞ p(HV|en) = 0] = 1, i.e. Probt [∀ε > 0 ∃N ≥ 0 ∀n ≥ N  p(HV|en) < ε] =1 (where in 
the latter case p(HV|en) drops to 0 as soon as R(en) − V ≠ ∅, if T−V ≠ ∅, or gradually, if V ⊃ T). 
 
Proof of Theorem 7:     
In order to prove this theorem we first prove two lemmas (adapted from T3, p. 57 and T8, p. 81, resp. 
in Kuipers, 1978). Assuming HV as condition, then for all non-empty proper subsets S of V (∅ ⊂ S ⊂ 
V) any infinite sequence of outcomes within the infinite product S
∞
 amounts to the truth of a universal 
generalization. Notation: |V| = v, |S| = s. 
 
Lemma 1 In a (conditional) Carnap-system genuine universal generalizations get probability 




|HV) = 0 for ∅ ⊂ S ⊂ V (and hence 0 < s < v). 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
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It follows from the Carnapian value pC(Qi|HV&en) = (ni + λV/v) / (n + λV)   (0< λV <∞) that 
pC(S|HV&en) = (nS + sλV/v) / (n + λV)  (nS =df Qj/
 and hence by the product rule that  
(*)  pC(S
m
|HV) = ∏ / +  l /n / / + # Io  = ∏ {1  1l/n   // + }# Io  
There is a well-known theorem (Knopp, 1956, p. 96) that (*) tends to 0, with certainty, if m → ∞, i.e. 
limm ∞pC(S
m
|HV) = 0, iff ∑ 1l/n  // +   =  Io , which is true for 0 < λV < ∞, for the sum 
is comparable to Σ 1/n. Qed. 
 
Lemma 2 Universal convergence (with certainty) in a Hintikka-system  
Let R(en) = R, |R| = r>0, then p(HR|en) → 1 if n → ∞ and R remains constant, in the sense 
that, with certainty, limm→∞ p(HR|enR
m
) =1 and for R⊂V⊆K, p(HV|en) → 0 if n → ∞ and R 
remains constant, in the sense that, with certainty, limm→∞ p(HV|enR
m
) = 0, provided p(HR) > 0.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Note first that  
(1) p(HR|enR
m












) for R⊂V⊆K 
Moreover, we have 
(3) p(enR
m
) = p(HR) pC(en|HR) pC(R
m
|HR&en) + Σ R⊂V⊆K p(HV) pC(en|HV) pC(R
m
|HV&en) 
From Lemma 1 and  
pC(R|HV&en) = (n+rλV/v) / (n+λV)  pC(V−R|HV&en) = (v−r)λV / v(n+λV) 
we get that limm→∞ pC(R
m
|HR&en) = 1 and limm→∞ pC(R
m
|HV&en) = 0 for V⊃R. Hence, using (1), (2), 
and (3), we get p(HR|enR
m
) → 1 if m → ∞, i.e. limm→∞ p(HR|enR
m
) =1. That p(HV|enR
m
) → 0 if m → ∞ 
for all v>r, i.e. limm→∞ p(HV|enR
m
) = 0, follows now from the fact that they are all non-negative and 
that their sum equals 1−p(HR|enR
m
). Qed. 
Now Theorem 7 directly follows from Lemma 2 and Theorem 6. The latter guarantees with probability 
1 that from a certain stage on R remains constant, viz. T. Qed. 
 
Theorem 9 Deterministic-Probabilistic Quasi-Success Theorem (DPQ-Success Theorem) 
If HW is d-closer to the deterministic truth HT than HV (by assumption entailed by ‘∆-closer to‘) then 
with probability 1 HW will in the long run be estimated to be d-closer to the truth than HV 
((EDT(HW|en) < EDT(HV|en)).  
Formally: if d(W, T) < d(V, T) then Probt [limn →∞ (EDT(HW|en) < EDT(HV|en))] = 1,  




Proof of Theorem 9:  
From Corollary 7.1, we get:  
(1) Probt [lim n→∞ EDT(V|en) = d(V, T)] =1 and Probt [lim n→∞ EDT(W|en) = d(W, T)] =1. 
From (1) we get, using p(A&B) = 1 if p(A)=p(B)=1,  
Probt [lim n→∞ EDT(V|en) = d(V, T) and lim n→∞ EDT(W|en) = d(W, T)] =1 
≡ 
Probt [∀ε>0 ∃N≥0 ∀n≥N |EDT(V|en) − d(V, T)| < ε and ∀ε>0 ∃N≥0 ∀n≥N |EDT(W|en) − d(W, T)| < ε] =1 
≡ 
(2) Probt [∀ε>0 ∃N≥0 ∀n≥N |EDT(V|en) − d(V, T)| < ε and |EDT(W|en) − d(W, T)| < ε] =1 
 
Assume d(W, T) < d(V, T), hence d(V, T) − d(W, T) =df 3D > 0. Hence, from (2): 
(3) Probt [∀ε: D>ε>0∃N≥0 ∀n≥N |EDT(V|en) − d(V, T)| < ε < D and |EDT(W|en) − d(W, T)| < ε < D] =1 
As is easily seen by representation on an axis, 
 
    d(W, T)   d(V, T)   
       0         1 
   EDT(W|en)      EDT(V|en) 
           2ε            2ε 
    3D (> 3ε) 
we may now conclude 
(4)  Probt [∀ε: D>ε>0∃N≥0 ∀n≥N (EDT(HV|en) − EDT(HW|en) > ε] =1 
In sum, if d(W, T) < d(V, T) then with probability 1 (EDT(HW|en) < EDT(HV|en) for n →∞, i.e. 
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